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ABSTRACT 
Zero-day vulnerabilities are those that have not previously been identified and thus 
are in their zeroth day of existence. These vulnerabilities are the most potentially 
damaging from a cyber defense perspective because the defender is unaware of their 
existence and a malicious attacker can exploit them to take control of a system without the 
owner’s consent or knowledge. Zero-day vulnerabilities are also highly valuable to 
offensive cyber operations as they may be exploited before defenders are aware of their 
existence or can patch their systems to adequately defend them. This comprehensive 
study of zero-day vulnerabilities is focused on showing them to be a vital factor in 
cyber operations. Offensive cyber operators can benefit from techniques that help 
accelerate the development time of a zero-day exploit. In contrast, defenders and 
vendors can reduce their response time by improving their methodology to discover and 
patch zero-day vulnerabilities. This research provides an extensive review of zero-day 
vulnerabilities and examines their overall impact on targeted system security. 
We present characteristics of a system that increase its susceptibility to zero-
day vulnerabilities and security measures to improve the zero-day vulnerability 
awareness of the defender. We also propose techniques for reducing the development 
time of zero-day exploits to enhance offensive cyber operations. 
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A vulnerability in computer software is a loophole in the computer code and/or its 
configuration that can possibly compromise the security of a computer system [1]. An 
adversary can exploit such vulnerabilities and take control of a system without the approval 
or, in many cases, without the knowledge of its user. Among an adversary’s actions, zero-
day exploits make use of a vulnerability whose existence is still unknown to computer 
system defenders and software vendors. These vulnerabilities are potentially the most 
damaging from a cyber defense perspective because the defender has no knowledge of their 
existence, and a patch for the affected software has not yet been developed [2]. 
The security level of a computer system is often measured by the total count of 
vulnerabilities on the system and the time required to exploit them, or the time required for 
the implementation and distribution of software patches to mitigate the vulnerabilities. In 
the face of zero-day vulnerabilities, these measures can become skewed because a full 
understanding of existing vulnerabilities is not possible. For the adversary, developing a 
reliable zero-day exploit can be challenging, but it can be extremely rewarding since it will 
be unknown to defenders, and ideally, will work on any configuration of a vulnerable target 
[3]. 
Zero-days attacks are more frequent today than they were in the past, and they 
remain undercover for long periods of time, making them much more pernicious than other 
types of attacks. The time to develop a zero-day exploit must include the time to identify a 
zero-day vulnerability, and then the time to conduct reconnaissance against target systems. 
This development time will also depend greatly on the skill and risk tolerance of the 
attacker, as well as the security configuration of defended systems. Research in 2009 
showed that 80 percent of critical vulnerabilities had a functional exploit within ten days 
of their public disclosure [4]. Moreover, RAND Corporation in 2017 reported that, once 
the vulnerability researchers detect an exploitable vulnerability, the time for developing a 
reliable exploit is relatively short, with a median time of 22 days [3]. 
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For these reasons, this comprehensive study of zero-day vulnerabilities is focused 
on showing them to be a vital factor in cyber operations. Offensive cyber operators could 
benefit from techniques which help accelerate the development time of a zero-day exploit. 
In contrast, defenders and vendors could reduce their response time by improving their 
methodology to discover and patch zero-day vulnerabilities. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this work is to examine the development time of zero-day exploits 
and how it can affect cybersecurity in current enterprise systems. The research also 
examines techniques for reducing the development time of these exploits in order to 
support offensive cyber operations. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
We achieved the objectives of this thesis by focusing on the following research 
questions: 
1. Primary Question 
How does the existence of zero-day vulnerabilities in computer systems, and the 
time for adversaries to develop exploits against these vulnerabilities, impact the overall 
level of cybersecurity of that system? 
2. Secondary Question 
How might the total time to develop zero-day exploits, including the time to 
identify associated zero-day vulnerabilities, be reduced to better support offensive cyber 
operators? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
There are two main contributions of this research. The first is to survey and draw 
together the field of disparate resources about zero-day vulnerabilities into one study. The 
second contribution benefits the area of offensive cyber operations by providing a thorough 
study of useful techniques for reducing the development time of zero-day exploits. By more 
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widely disseminating information and knowledge about this topic, the report enables those 
who design security systems to create systems that are even more impervious to malicious 
actors. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into the following chapters. 
1. Chapter II: Background 
Chapter II provides background research to understand the basic terminology 
concerning zero-day vulnerabilities and zero-day exploits and attacks. We analyze the 
zero-day vulnerability cycle and its impact on cybersecurity, and the importance of zero-
day vulnerabilities in offensive and defensive cyber operations (OCO/DCO). 
2. Chapter III: Information System Security and Zero-Day 
Vulnerabilities 
Chapter III examines the dynamic concept of information security. It analyzes the 
procedures for system configuration and their contribution to defense against zero-day 
exploits. 
3. Chapter IV: Zero-Day Attacks 
Chapter IV describes the impacts of zero-day vulnerabilities to cyber system 
defense. It analyzes potential characteristics that can make a system more susceptible to 
zero-day vulnerabilities, and suggests countermeasures and guidelines for increasing zero-
day vulnerability awareness. Finally, it examines the life cycle of exploit development, and 
how knowledge of a zero-day vulnerability can affect it beneficially. 
4. Chapter V: Conclusion and Future Work 
Chapter V summarizes the research results of this thesis. Additionally, the chapter 
provides recommendations for future work to further extend this research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Software vulnerabilities are a significant cause of cybersecurity problems. Zero-
day vulnerabilities represent a unique category, as they remain unknown to defenders, and 
they are prone to exploitation before software vendors release patches. Those who have 
knowledge of vulnerabilities may create exploits and perform cyber-attacks to take control 
of a computer. This chapter provides an overview of the fundamental concepts and types 
of vulnerabilities. The focus of this work will be zero-day vulnerabilities and their 
importance in cyber operations. 
A. VULNERABILITIES OVERVIEW 
Vulnerabilities in computer security are considered as weaknesses in a system that 
can grant access to a malicious user and provide unwilling any kind of advantage in that 
system. The International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) standard on 
information security risk management defines a “vulnerability as a weakness of an asset or 
group of assets that can be exploited by one or more threats” [5]. Taken together, a 
vulnerability and a threat that may exploit that vulnerability constitute a risk to the system. 
Vulnerability exploitation can be performed through the use of specific tools, 
depending on the vulnerability present on the system, with varied results. Thus, a 
vulnerability could be considered a steppingstone, possibly leading to a system 
compromise. However, this does not necessarily mean that all vulnerabilities lead to 
security risks to the system.  
For example, a vulnerable system that contains no sensitive data may be prone to 
exploitation, but compromising it might not be considered a security risk since the 
malicious user would gain nothing of value from it. Such an example is a honeypot, which 
is a purposely created vulnerable system containing no critical data or services. Honeypots 
are used to either identify and trap potential attackers, or to stall their progress by leading 
them to deadends on a network. 
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There are huge collections of ever-expanding databases consisting of known 
vulnerabilities that are used to help test and identify potential weaknesses in systems. One 
of the most prominent of these is the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 
system. CVE provides a list of publicly known vulnerabilities, where each entry 
corresponds to an identification entry number, a brief description of the vulnerability, and 
at least one public reference [6]. 
1. Importance and Applications of Vulnerabilities 
In terms of importance, the existence of security vulnerabilities is the cornerstone 
of computer hacking and exploitation. Vulnerability exploitation is the way most, if not all, 
systems are compromised, and it is a matter of fact that vulnerabilities will never cease to 
exist. One way or another, most systems prove to be vulnerable to something eventually, 
such as flaws in coding, system setup, or even human error. Security vulnerabilities 
sometimes even transcend computer systems since attempts like social engineering could 
be performed without any technical skills being put in use. A company or an organization 
that is not sufficiently prepared by educating its employees on these matters is considered 
vulnerable in this case. In this manner, the existence of security vulnerabilities is one of 
the most critical aspects of information security. Ensuring secure systems is a constant act 
of discovering and fixing new vulnerabilities, while at the same time, maintaining those 
systems in order to avoid being affected by already discovered vulnerabilities.  
According to Erickson [7], vulnerabilities can be categorized as design, 
implementation, and operational. Design vulnerabilities are those that are caused by 
mistakes or oversights in the way software has been designed to operate. In this category 
of vulnerabilities, computer software operates exactly as it was intended to, but the problem 
lies in the fact that it was designed to do the wrong thing. Design flaws are also known as 
high-level vulnerabilities, or issues with program requirements or constraints. There is a 
distinction, however, in design flaws between software requirements and software 
specifications. Every software systems design is driven by requirements. That plainly 
means that every computer program has a specific purpose or scope, and it is designed to 
accomplish some set of objectives that fill that purpose. So, in a sense, requirements are 
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the list of objectives to be accomplished by the program. After software requirements have 
been specified, they are used by software engineers as guides to construct the plans for how 
the program should be constructed to meet those requirements. These plans are called the 
program’s specifications [7].  
In the case of implementation vulnerabilities, the source code is working as 
intended, i.e., it meets the design specifications, but the security problem lies in the way 
the program’s operation are carried out. Problems such as this often occur due to technical 
discrepancies, when a solution that deviates from the design is implemented. 
Implementation vulnerabilities are also known as low-level or technical flaws. The practice 
of code reviewing immensely helps in the identification of implementation vulnerabilities 
since they are mostly caused by technical artifacts or similar nuances in the developed 
code. Some of the most common implementation vulnerabilities are buffer overflows and 
SQL injections, which will be explained later in Section 2.  
Operational vulnerabilities cannot be identified by reviewing a program’s source 
code because they occur during the interaction between program software and its 
environment. They are generally caused by issues with software configuration in a specific 
environment, or by automated and manual processes supporting the system. Operational 
vulnerabilities can be exploited by attacks mainly directed to users, like social engineering 
and theft. The distinction between operational and design or implementation vulnerabilities 
is not entirely clear. This is mostly due to the fact that there is overlap in these concepts, 
so these distinctions are mainly to be used as references. 
2. Types of Computer System Vulnerabilities 
Following is list of some commonly known vulnerability types: 
a. Bugs 
When the result from a software or a system is not accurate or unexpected is 
generally due to what is known as a software bug. A software bug exists in a system or a 
program as an error or a flaw and can make it to behave in unintended ways [8]. Various 
techniques or tools are used to pinpoint bugs, a process most notably known as 
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“debugging.” Additionally, most of the modern computer systems are embedded with 
proper software that, during their operation, is responsible for preventing, detecting, and 
auto-correcting several software bugs to protect the system from halting. 
Errors and mistakes in the general design, in the source code, or in the components 
that are used by a program could be the cause of several bugs. Incorrect code produced by 
compilers may also cause some bugs. A program is called defective when it consists of too 
many or too severe bugs that compromise its intended functionality. However, the effects 
of bugs could be subtle or catastrophic by triggering errors with ripple effects that finally 
will crash or halt the execution of the system.  
Some bugs qualify as security bugs. Security bugs are especially harmful because 
they could potentially enable a malicious user to gain control of the vulnerable system by 
manipulating the data passed and handled by it in order to perform in unintended ways. 
b. Weak passwords 
Passwords are the most common authentication tool used in security to ensure that 
sensitive data does not get compromised [9]. An effective password is determined by its 
strength and its ease to be remembered by the user. A strong password means that it is 
crafted in a way that cannot be guessed easily. In that sense, weak passwords are those that 
contain easily accessed knowledge about a user (birthdays, names), or easy character 
sequences that can be found in common wordlists. An insecure password can be 
compromised by a brute force attack, a type of attack that utilizes computing power using 
trial-and-error to guess the targeted password.  
Brute force attacks can be either blind, trying combinations of different characters, 
or targeted by using a wordlist. A wordlist is generally a text file that includes commonly 
known passwords (the most common passwords being sequences of “a” or “1,” or strings 
such as “qwerty” or “12345…”), and is used by the brute force tool potentially speeding 
up the process in case the password tested is included in the file. These types of brute force 
attacks are commonly known as dictionary attacks. Some of the most notable brute force 
attack tools are JohnTheRipper and Hydra, but many other variations target specific 
platforms as well. Most password cracking systems consist of some brute-force attack 
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protection techniques such as measuring the intervals between each password input, 
meaning that too fast betrays an automated attack taking place, or by limiting the times of 
failed attempts to a certain number, negating trial-and-error attempts as a result.  
As previously mentioned, a password is effective when it is easy to use and can be 
easily remembered by the user. A generally bad practice is having a potentially strong 
password written down on physical or digital notes, thereby nullifying its strength if it falls 
on the wrong hands. This risk is mitigated by password management software such as 
KeePass [10], which helps maintain the integrity of many different strong passwords for 
the user. 
c. Virus-infected software 
A virus is a type of code attached to software that is generally being executed along 
with the original code, writing and replicating itself into a target system [11]. The virus 
code uses elevated privileges in order to replicate itself and can execute various commands 
totally unintended by the original program, resulting in data breach or destruction. Virus 
code writers use critical system knowledge along with social engineering techniques to 
spread the virus to the target system or network of systems. A virus can be masked by the 
extension of a file, for example, or by having its code injected on the source code of a 
program or a file, masking itself from the user. Most viruses are also crafted in ways to 
avoid detection from anti-virus software altogether. Executing the legitimate program 
causes the virus to be unintentionally executed as well.  
The majority of viruses target Microsoft Windows operating systems [12]. This is 
partly because of its popularity, but also because these operating systems share similar or 
identical footholds to be exploited, meaning that a virus targeting a Windows distribution 
is effective in all similar distributions. Operating system diversity protects against viruses 
in this way, since a virus crafted for a Windows distribution cannot operate in a Linux 
environment. This does not mean that Linux operating systems are impervious to computer 
viruses, which is a common misconception. 
By default, Linux and Unix operating systems prevent normal users from tampering 
with the operating system environment without permission, but this is not generally true 
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for Windows operating systems, leaving them vulnerable to viruses in case of user error 
[13]. A virus called “Bliss” was created in 1997 targeting Linux distributions. A 
requirement for Bliss to execute was that it be run by the user, thus it would have the same 
privileges on files of that user. As a result, it was unlikely for the virus to tamper with the 
operating system since most users in Linux distributions do not have administrative or 
“root” access alternatively. The Bliss virus was created mostly for research purposes and 
never really became widespread. 
d. Lack of data encryption 
A severe vulnerability that might occur is the absence of encryption on sensitive 
data prior to its storage or transmission [7]. This vulnerability makes Man-in-the-Middle 
(MitM) attacks possible, where a malicious user attempts to highjack transmissions 
between the vulnerable system and another party, leading to sensitive data compromise. 
MitM attacks are generally prevented by encrypting data prior to transmission, thus making 
it much more difficult for an eavesdropper to process without the decryption key. 
e. OS command injection 
OS command injection is a security vulnerability, also known as shell injection 
[14]. It allows the arbitrary execution of OS commands, which usually used by a malicious 
user to elevate his privileges in the vulnerable system. This action can easily result in data 
loss or compromise since the malicious user could potentially gain access to all of the target 
system’s resources. OS command injection can be executed through vulnerable web 
services or poorly designed software. To mitigate this vulnerability, it is highly 
recommended to sanitize user inputs to system and application software since this is the 
only way a user could inject OS commands. 
f. SQL injection 
SQL injection is another kind of command injection vulnerability [15]. Instead of 
executing operating system commands, a malicious user performing SQL injection 
attempts to execute commands on the database management system running of a vulnerable 
system. The results of a successful SQL injection could vary from stolen data to massive 
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data loss. In the worst-case scenario, the whole backend database system could be 
compromised. SQL injection is possible when user input is not correctly sanitized, thereby 
allowing a malicious user to pass unintended malicious commands to the database.  
g. Buffer overflow 
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities occur when user input data exceeds what the 
program was initially designed to handle [16]. This excess data is written to nearby memory 
blocks, corrupting other data, or overwriting it with malicious code. As a result, the affected 
program does not behave as it was intended, and this irregular behavior could be 
manipulated to affect the vulnerable system in various ways. 
Susceptibility to buffer overflow vulnerabilities varies depending on the 
programming language used. Some older programming languages such as C or C++ are 
more prone to buffer overflow exploitation since they require the programmer to handle 
memory allocation manually. Languages like PHP or Python are less susceptible to buffer 
overflows because they automate the memory handling process. This, however, does not 
mean that they are completely invulnerable. Finding a buffer overflow vulnerability can be 
quite difficult, however, potential buffer overflow vulnerabilities consist of serious risks 
and may lead to data compromise, denial of service, or even a complete system takeover 
through privilege escalation.  
Two are the primary type of buffer overflow vulnerabilities, the first one is the stack 
overflow, while the second one is the heap overflow. Stack buffer overflows consist of 
buffer overflows on the stack, which is the memory space that the operating system uses 
to store function return addresses, and local variables. Data storage or retrieval on the stack 
is organized in the last-in-first-out order (LIFO). On the other hand, heap buffer overflows 
occur by manipulating the heap, or the memory space used as dynamic data storage. Heap 
memory reservation and management is controlled by an executing program instead of the 
operating system. 
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h. Ineffective access control 
The access control software is responsible for performing the authorization checks 
every time an actor is trying to access a resource or proceed to execute an action. [17]. In 
the case of a user with valid credentials, authorization is the method of deciding if the user 
will need to access a specific resource, taking into consideration the user’s context rights 
or permissions or different access control requirement which have been provided to the 
resource. 
In the cases that effective access control checked are not enforced or implemented, 
users would have access to information or perform operations that under different access 
control checks would not be permitted [17]. This may result in improper data leakages, 
denial of service, and arbitrary code execution. 
i. Use of broken algorithms 
The use of weak or flawed algorithms, or the incorrect application of stable 
algorithms, might lead to sensitive information been leaked [18]. A determined attacker 
can easily identify a non-standard algorithm and break it, and this action will compromise 
whatever data have been protected. Coding errors in design, implementation, or 
programming logic increase the probability an attacker already knows or could gain the 
knowledge and the tools to subvert the security mechanisms. 
j. Missing authentication for critical function 
This type of vulnerability is a flaw in the code of a vulnerable application that 
occurs when there is a lack of proper authentication before performing essential tasks that 
might cause damage to the system [19]. As an example, requiring no mail authentication 
before changing the password to an account could lead to the account being taken over by 
an attacker quite easily. 
k. Unrestricted upload of dangerous file types 
Unrestricted user file upload could prove to be a critical system vulnerability [20]. 
A malicious user could attempt to exploit this vulnerability by uploading dangerous file 
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types like executables that could severely affect or compromise the system. Uploading and 
executing a reverse shell, for example, is a common way to get unauthorized access to a 
system. The consequences of this exploitation depend on what the malicious software is 
programmed to do with the uploaded files, and additional attention should be paid where 
the files will be stored. Files upload exploitation with no restrictions could vary in results; 
some of them could be that the complete system would be taken over,  overloaded the 
system, client-side attacks, redirecting the attacks to a back-end system, or just a system 
defacement. 
This vulnerability also can be applicable to web server applications, where it is 
known as command injection vulnerability [21]. These web applications are used for the 
convenience of the user when he needs to interact with the underlying operating system, 
the file system, or a database. However, if the user’s inputs are insufficiently validated, 
severe security problems may occur. In this way, the host operating system could execute 
arbitrary operating system commands which are issued by an attacker. The term command 
injection attacks are referring to attacks that occur once an application or user accepts 
unvalidated user data to the operating system shell, such as HTTP headers, form, cookies, 
etc. [22]. In that event, very careful validation of input data should take place when a web 
application is allowed to pass user inputs to web server functions. 
l. Dependence on untrusted inputs in a security decision 
An untrusted user can modify inputs to an application in ways that bypass the 
protection mechanism of that application when these mechanisms rely on the basis that the 
inputs are trustworthy [23]. It is a common mistake for programmers to consider that 
trusted user data inputs such as hidden form fields, or cookies are impossible to modify. A 
malicious user could manipulate these values to gain an advantage over the system. This 
action is undetectable, and as a result, security decisions taken by these inputs may lead to 
attacks that getting around the security of the operating system or software. Any input that 
comes from an outsider to a system should be considered trustworthy by default. 
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m. Download of code without integrity checks 
When an application proceeds to download source code or executable files from 
untrustworthy locations without performing any verification on the code, then the integrity 
of the system that contains this application is at risk [24]. Malicious users could have 
dangerous code being executed by compromising the host server, modification of the code 
on transit, or DNS spoofing. 
n. Race conditions 
Race conditions describe vulnerabilities that result from the timing of actions that 
affect other types of actions on a system [25]. A race condition can occur under a variety 
of situations, from tracing processes to filesystem accesses, but it is especially prevalent in 
multithreaded and distributed software programs [26].  
Any system that involves a multiprocessing environment is vulnerable to race 
condition attacks. Such an attack can happen when multi-threaded applications are 
executed and they differ in the sequence in which they are being executed [27]. They 
generally involve one or more applications using the same resource. Until the resource 
becomes available, the multiple threads might use a key, called a semaphore, to control the 
multiple access and define which process can use the resource. If the semaphore is used 
improperly, or if the resource crashes, all processes will be waiting indefinitely, while no 
process is using the resource [27]. Race condition vulnerabilities receive limited attention, 
as they often go unspotted and it is difficult to eliminate them completely. 
B. ZERO-DAY 
In this section, we analyze the concept of a zero-day, to include zero-day 
vulnerabilities and what differentiates them from other common vulnerabilities. 
1. Meaning and Basic Concepts 
Zero-day is a term that bears some misconception since it has been widely misused, 
especially by the media. The earliest known use of the term was in 1998 in an e-zine called 
CRH, which described “Our member chameleon set us up with a domain in Argentina, the 
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D-Lab... It has some mad [stuff] on it, but you have to know where to look, because www.d-
lab.com.ar will take you nowhere, it has 0-day exploits on it, as well as other useful stuff 
and source code, check it out” [25]. The term was first commonly used to describe pirated 
versions of a legitimate product being made available to the public at the same time or 
before the official release.  
Nowadays, though, in terms of information security, zero-days describe something 
entirely different [28]. Vulnerabilities that are tagged as zero-day refer to their being 
unknown by those who must mitigate them. Until a viable solution is provided to mitigate 
a zero-day vulnerability, attackers can exploit it, resulting in programs, data, other 
computers, or entire networks being compromised. A zero-day, in this case, refers to the 
fact that the deadline in days for developers to mend the vulnerability is zero, meaning that 
their systems are probably already exposed to attack threats. 
Examining the perspectives of attackers and defenders regarding zero-day 
vulnerabilities, to attackers a zero-day vulnerability is a highly valuable way of accessing 
a target system [2]. Users and system administrators regard those types of vulnerabilities 
as a serious security risk for their clients. The same applies to vulnerable software vendors, 
since these vulnerabilities pose a serious threat to their clients and by extension to their 
own integrity and reputation.  
2. Zero-day Vulnerabilities: A Unique Category 
Based on research findings on zero-day vulnerabilities, there are some key facts 
that distinguish them from vulnerabilities in general. Zero-day vulnerabilities are not 
publicly disclosed, although sometimes software vendors know about bugs in their 
software and flaws that have not yet been patched.  
A FireEye report states that vulnerabilities identified by adversaries could stay 
publicly unknown on average of 310 days [29]. According to Symantec’s Internet Security 
Threat Report, in the year 2015, a new unknown vulnerability was discovered every seven 
days. Also, during the last few years, zero-day vulnerabilities are notably increasing, as 23 
zero-day vulnerabilities were reported in 2013, 24 in 2014, and 82 in 2016 [30]. 
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Another interesting fact is that zero-day vulnerabilities are mostly used in targeted 
attacks with only a few hosts as targets; the exceptions being a few high-profile attacks like 
Stuxnet [2]. Public disclosures of zero-day vulnerabilities seem to be followed by a massive 
increase of attacks that are taking advantage of any insufficient patch or the zero-day 
exploit that was used. According to research statistics, it is assumed that exploits of around 
42% of the attacks that were based on an exploitable zero-day vulnerability stay active 
within 30 days after they are publicly disclosed [2]. For cyber criminals, zero-day 
vulnerabilities in well-approved software like Microsoft Office and Adobe Reader serve as 
a free access point that allows them to compromise any target they want. Consequently, 
the market value of a new unpatched vulnerability ranges between $5000-$250,000 [31]. 
Based on these numbers, it is safe to assume that cybercriminals are constantly on watch 
for disclosure of new vulnerabilities so that they can exploit them.  
3. Life cycle of a Zero-Day Vulnerability 
Software vendors try to identify software vulnerabilities early in order to patch 
them and fix bugs with periodic software updates. Unfortunately, sometimes vulnerabilities 
are discovered by other actors, and exposed to exploitation before they can be patched by 
the vendor. In this situation, the software programmers had “zero days” to patch the 
vulnerabilities before they were exploitable, and were disclosed to the public. Thus, they 
became known as zero-day vulnerabilities.  
The life cycle of a zero-day vulnerability consists of seven phases, as shown in 
Figure 1. A zero-day vulnerability typically starts as a software bug. If the bug remains 
undetected by the software vendor, attackers might be able to exploit it, performing what 
it is called a zero-day attack against targets that exhibit the vulnerability. An attack can be 
characterized as a zero-day when vulnerabilities not yet publicly disclosed are exploited in 
order to perform the attack. When a vulnerability is discovered by software vendors, its 
information is usually disseminated to the public as a security issue. After that, the vendors 
release patch(es) for the zero-day vulnerability, and update anti-virus signatures with the 
new zero-day attack information. 
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Figure 1. Zero-day Vulnerability Life Cycle. Source: [2]. 
After a vulnerability has been discovered and patched by vendors, new exploits 
might still be developed and employed against targets that have not applied the patch yet. 
This cycle of patching-and-exploiting can take several years before remediation comes, 
and the vulnerability eventually ceases to affect systems. 
The life cycle of a zero-day vulnerability can also be marked in a timeline as shown 
in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Attack Timeline. Source: [2]. 
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• Vulnerability introduced (tv). This is the first phase where a bug is 
introduced to software that is being used by hosts worldwide, thus creating 
the vulnerability. 
• Exploit released in the wild (te). Vulnerability researchers identified that 
the vulnerability is exploitable. A fully functional exploit is created and 
used to compromise the security of targeted hosts. It is during this phase 
when exploits using zero-day vulnerabilities are being sold to interested 
parties. 
• Vulnerability discovered by the vendor (td). Through the process of 
internal testing or by a third-party report, the vulnerability is eventually 
discovered. As a result, the issue is exposed to the software vendor. 
• Vulnerability is disclosed publicly (t0). At this point in time, the 
vulnerability is announced to the public either by the vendor, or by 
forums, blogs or mailing lists, along with a CVE identifier assigned to it.  
• Anti-virus signatures released (ts). Following vulnerability disclosure to 
the public, anti-virus vendors update their software by updating the 
signature database for the ongoing attacks and eventually protecting the 
end-host that now can detect them from the new anti-virus signature. 
• Patch released (tp). A patch fixing the zero-day vulnerability is released 
by the vendor. This action mitigates the risk of exploitation on hosts that 
apply the patch. 
• Patch deployment completed (ta). The vulnerability ceases to affect the 
end hosts after they apply the patch. 
However, the events in the timeline in Figure 2 do not always appear in the given 
order, but in general, the relation is ta > tp ≥ td > tv and t0 ≥ td. Additionally, the association 
between td and te cannot be identified generally. By these definitions, it should be clear 
that the “zone” for a zero-day attack to occur is in the period between te and t0 [2]. 
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4. Real-World Examples of Zero-day Attacks 
It is a common misconception that zero-day attacks and zero-day exploits are the 
same thing. This is far from the truth, however, there is a direct correlation between the 
two terms. A zero-day exploit is targeting software flaws and is intending to access data, 
behave as another user, or even take control of a system without the approval or, in many 
cases, without their knowledge of the user [32]. A zero-day attack is the actual operation 
of a cyber-attack using the exploit code to compromise a specific target.  
In February 2013, a zero-day attack was reported in Adobe Reader 10 and 11 that 
was able to bypass the contained sandbox anti-exploitation protection feature. Experts later 
concluded that the exploit used was in fact, so highly sophisticated that it was either 
developed by a nation-state as a cyber-espionage tool, or belonged to private contractors 
supporting law enforcement and used for communication interception purposes [33]. 
Another notable example of a zero-day attack was when Sony Pictures Entertainment fell 
victim to such an attack during 2014. The reasons behind the attack were political, and the 
aftermath left the company with approximately 100 terabytes of valuable data being stolen, 
including email addresses of senior executives, contracts, business plans, and user 
accounts, along with four unreleased feature films [34]. 
Microsoft almost fell victim to a zero-day attack on June 2016 when a zero-day 
exploit targeting Windows OS was found on sale in the dark web [34]. This exploit made 
possible a local privilege escalation on Windows 10 systems since it was able to grant any 
user account with administrative privileges. It is unknown, however if the exploit was sold 
eventually or not. The Democratic National Committee hack, on the other hand, is known 
as one of the most widely covered cyber-attacks in history. Attacks began when thousands 
of spear phishing e-mails were sent to target employees working for the DNC. E-mails 
contained malicious links to phishing pages, giving total control to the user’s PC and its 
internal network to attackers. Six zero-day exploits were found to be utilized by attackers 
aiming at operating systems, Microsoft Windows 10 included, as well as Adobe Flash 
Player and Java [34].  
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Arguably, the most famous zero-day attack was the one known as Stuxnet, which 
was publicly disclosed in 2010, even though it is suspected that the actual attack took place 
earlier. Stuxnet is one of the earliest known digital weapons developed, employing a highly 
infectious, self-replicating worm that was developed by one or more unnamed nations [35]. 
Stuxnet’s final goal was to reprogram an industrial control system and the attack was 
mainly designed to target and destroy Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
equipment being used in Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which  was being used in nuclear 
fuel enrichment processes. Stuxnet is the first incident that was spread to worldwide media 
and marked the beginning of a new era on cyber-warfare conduct [36]. Regarding its 
technical details, this was the first time an exploit used several zero-day vulnerabilities 
simultaneously, along with a variety of other vulnerabilities as well. That fact marks 
Stuxnet as a highly sophisticated cyber weapon clearly ahead of its time. 
C. CYBER OPERATIONS 
Cyberspace as a domain provides opportunities, challenges, and the advantage of 
allowing actions that may be taken anonymously across the entire globe. Cyber-attacks 
may occur whatever the location may be, without worrying about barriers like physical 
access or weather conditions [37]. The U.S. Department of Defense defines cyberspace as 
a “notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer 
networks” [38]. With that defined, cyberspace operations consist of those operations 
employed with the intention to achieve objectives through cyberspace. The activities of 
cyberspace operations are executed in three separate but synchronized mission areas: 
Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO), Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO), and 
Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) Operations [39]. 
1. Offensive/Defensive Cyber Operations 
In terms of cyber warfare, offense has a clear advantage over defense because it is 
immensely easier to conduct a successful cyber-attack compared to defending against one 
[40]. This is true because the ultimate goal of technical defense would be to avoid the 
endanger of a target, where it is assumed the defending party must be able to defend the 
system successfully against each and every attack, in contrast, the attacking party will need 
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to be successful only one time [41]. However, the reliance on cyberspace for every 
operation drives defenders to continuously try to find ways to preserve the confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity of their systems for any known and unknown threats or 
vulnerabilities. Defenders need to determine their security needs by often conducting a risk 
analysis for their organization. Given the facts, it is realistically impossible for a defender 
to eliminate all system risk entirely. They can only mitigate risks by following proactive 
cyberspace security actions and security best practices. The Internet was originally 
designed to establish reliable, and easy connections and security was not a priority back in 
those days. As a result, connection is established even if the true identities of the connector 
and the incoming connection are obfuscated. In this regard, zero-day vulnerabilities are 
especially prized by offenders since they offer a sure way to compromise a target system 
unknowingly to its defenders. 
Regarding cyber operations, coordination between offensive and defensive teams 
of the same group must be maintained. The reason behind this is that a cyber-attack 
launched at a given target could result in a counter-response from the adversary party, 
directly threatening defense. Also, when launching a cyber-attack, disruption of crucial 
civilian activity is a probable scenario that results in defensive implications. 
Steps were taken to ensure defense against cyber-attacks are mostly proactive, 
aiming to harden and monitor defending systems. However, the larger the environment to 
be defended the more difficult it is to implement those defenses. Even though monitoring 
on large scale is possible nowadays, more sophisticated activities like intrusion detection 
and the conduct of vulnerability assessments can only be performed successfully on a 
smaller scale. In general, a strong defense against cyber-attacks consists of forming and 
maintaining strong security policies along with effective surveillance and tracking 
communication moving in and out of the target system. Intrusion detection and prevention 
on a smaller scale are essential as well. The main tools on maintaining a solid defense are 
the regular conducts of vulnerability assessments and penetration tests. Precautions have 
to be taken into consideration as well, with disaster recovery planning in case an attack 
succeeds to some degree can help mitigate the damage. Implementation of defense in depth 
is also a successful approach in which security is layered with several different lines of 
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defense standing between the attackers and the data to be protected. All in all, the main 
goal of defense is to slow down the attackers long enough to detect them or even completely 
fend off their operations. However, maintaining impenetrable defense for an indefinite 
period of time is unrealistic, so in the worst-case scenario, measures have to be taken to 
ensure damage mitigation. 
Whereas defense usually revolves around protecting a large group of 
interconnected systems, attacking is usually focused on a particular system or a small set 
of them. The steps of a successful attack are reconnaissance, further vulnerability scanning, 
accessing, privilege escalation, and finally exploitation. Reconnaissance focuses on 
information gathering on the target, in order to collect specific information that will support 
the attack procedure. The target is then scanned for potential vulnerabilities to be used 
against. Access to the system is then obtained through vulnerability exploitation, but in 
most cases, this level of access does not possess enough privileges to perform the attack. 
Privilege escalation is the process that gives attackers administrator privileges or root 
access, through which they can accomplish their goals. Throughout the whole attack 
process, activity obfuscation must be maintained for the attackers to avoid detection. This 
is usually accomplished by removing traces of activity on target, such as system logs. 
2. Cyber-attack vs. Cyber Exploitation 
While cyber exploitation and cyber-attack might easily be confused, though they 
share some similarities, they are quite different in legal constructs as well as in their 
objectives [42]. This misconception is largely the result of both using similar technology, 
as well as sharing similarities in operational considerations. The main thing that 
distinguishes a cyber exploitation from a cyber-attack is in the payload. In both types of 
cyber actions, a vulnerability must be found first and then exploited, however only the 
cyber-attack typically launches a payload. Mission objectives greatly differ in general, as 
the mission of cyber exploitation is to compromise the confidentiality of valuable data on 
the target, whereas a cyber-attack would be more likely to be directed at destroying data to 
harm the target. However, it is important to note that a payload can execute several 
functions at the same time, both for cyber-attack and cyber exploitation. Due to the strong 
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relationship between technologies used in both actions, the cost of acquisitioning a 
software or a tool for cyber exploitation with the capability to cyber-attack is likely to be 
low. 
There are several case scenarios on what an adversary might aim to accomplish 
during a cyber exploitation. For example, the adversary could from just observing the 
attached network structure and the data traffic, be able to exploit information on that 
network. In this case, the cyber exploiter would aim to gather valuable information while 
being undetected in order to exploit the target when the time is right. Valuable information 
like plans and codes could be extracted that way from unsuspecting adversaries. Another 
course of action would be to gain confidential information through the organization’s 
network, which could be beneficial for their competitors. 
A cyber exploitation operation should have a little known signature, which will 
greatly aid the success of the operation since it will typically consist of many smaller 
individual actions that will be done throughout the course of the attack, the preparation for 
the attach it would even take weeks or months. The target may even be in a position to tell 
the difference between a cyber-attack and a cyber-exploitation, which is even more difficult 
to distinguish when the time frame between the operations is short. Legal authorities 
required for those operations are quite different from each other, so clarity of operations is 
essential to avoid any conflicts. As a result of sharing similar approaches, developing 
expertise at cyber-attacks mostly accomplishes developing knowledge for conducting 
cyber exploitation, and vice versa. 
Coordination between cyber-attack and cyber exploitation teams on a group is 
essential. Without this, several issues could occur, for example, having the exploitation 
team retrieve confidential data, only to prove later that the cyber-attack team planted this 
same data to confuse the adversary party. Both teams must consult each other between 
operations since shutting down a target’s communication channel, while probably causing 
disarray to the adversaries, would also prevent the extraction of valuable data.  
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A vulnerability is a type of software bug considered to be a security risk that leads 
to a system weakness. Malicious code can be written to exploit or take advantage of system 
vulnerabilities, and seize the control of a machine not only without the user’s permission 
but even without the user’s knowledge. There are many different types of vulnerabilities 
that can result from software bugs, weak passwords, and virus-infected software. 
Some key facts distinguish zero-day vulnerabilities from vulnerabilities in general. 
Zero-day vulnerabilities are those which are exposed to exploitation before they are 
publicly disclosed and patched by the vendor. Zero-day exploits are mainly an advantage 
for an adversary who is associated with zero-day vulnerabilities, and are used in prominent 
cyber-attacks against high profile targets like the ones against Microsoft by the Stuxnet 
worm, as well as in defensive cyber operations. 
Among the many actions taken in cyberspace, cyber-attacks can be most 
advantageous, as the attacker need not worry about location barriers. Cyber-attacks and 
cyber exploitation share some operational similarities but have significant differences in 
terms of payload and mission objectives. Despite this fact, their coordination is essential 
for successful cyber operations. 
In the next chapter, our center of attention is the dynamic concept of information 
security, a domain that is constantly evolving alongside the evolution of networks and 
computers. We will analyze the procedure of the system’s configuration and the importance 
of a well-secured configuration in defending against zero-day exploits. 
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III. INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY AND ZERO-DAY 
VULNERABILITIES 
Information is the most critical asset for modern organizations. The process of 
information security is fundamental to minimizing security risks, responding at the same 
time to the rapid evolution of the information environment and computer systems. In this 
chapter, we focus on information systems security as it continues to develop as an 
organizational function. The configuration of a system is our first line for an effective 
defense against zero-day exploitation. We then discuss the principles that need to 
characterize a well-secured configuration, and lastly, we examine an actual cyber-attack to 
emphasize the severe impact of a zero-day attack in a poorly configured environment. 
A. INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
There are several definitions of information systems (IS) in the literature. Laudon 
and Laudon [43] define an IS as a set of related components in an organization that are 
responsible for the collection, processing, storage, and distribution of necessary 
information essential for decision-making. Also, this information assists managers in 
finding solutions for various problems and promotes coordination and control inside the 
organization. For our analysis, this definition is sufficiently detailed and comprehensive. 
An IS contains information about the organization and the environment around it. 
As seen in Figure 3, an IS performs three key functions—input information, process them, 
and finally output—to create the data that the owner needs, while feedback will be required 
for the evaluation, and the improvement of the input. As previously mentioned, the 
environment around would also need to communicate with the internal organization and 
its information system. The environment around can differ depending on the organization 




Figure 3. Functions of an Information System. Source: [43]. 
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY 
IS security, often called InfoSec, refers to a set of procedures, human and 
technological resources, and processes that are responsible for the protection of an 
organization’s information. Information worth being protected has some critical 
characteristics essential to the organization’s operation. These include information 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, called the “CIA Triad” in InfoSec. Some security 
practitioners also add accuracy, authenticity, utility, and possession to this triad to 
sufficiently respond to the continually evolving computer environment [44]. 
InfoSec is not a specific technology and cannot be bought off the shelf. It is a 
dynamic process that must be undertaken alongside the evolution of the organization’s 
network itself. This process extends beyond technical issues to promote system safety and 
eliminate potential security incidents successfully. 
Security is mostly about protecting assets from severe threats that may exploit 
system or network vulnerabilities. In the case of InfoSec, this definition is extended beyond 
system resources and refers to all forms of information itself. Cyberspace as a domain is 
contained in the information environment, and as a result, there is a distinct 
interdependency between cyber activities and InfoSec activities [45]. 
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The DOD’s Joint Publication 3-12 (JP 3-12) provides joint doctrine and military 
guidance on cyberspace operations. JP 3-12 outlines a three-layered representation of 
cyberspace to better support the planning and execution of cyberspace operations: physical 
network, logical network, and cyber-persona. While each of the layers has a different focus, 
they all are interrelated and somewhat reliant on each other [45]. 
1. Physical Network Layer 
The physical layer consists of the hardware and infrastructure, such as storage and 
network devices, sensors, transducers, and wired or wireless communication links between 
them. Physical components are prone to physical damage since the physical layer itself has 
a grounded sense of location. As a result, physical security measures and mechanisms need 
to be employed to prevent unauthorized access to this layer [45]. 
2. Logical Network Layer 
The logical layer consists of the software and its manifestations, and the network 
elements that are code-related and make use of the physical foundations [45]. The decisions 
made at this level define the nature of cyberspace, its strengths, and its limitations. How 
the network is built, its capabilities, and why vulnerabilities exist constitute part of the 
logical layer. Within this layer, we observe sub-layers that provide services to the layers 
above them, while they are designed to be combined to offer more complex services. For 
example, some low-level services are the mechanisms for data transport. Out of these are 
built applications like a database or web pages, and if we combine these, we get dynamic 
content generation and active web objects.  
At this level, cyberspace is a series of stacked platforms, one being the foundation 
for the next one above it. New capabilities are established on each platform in response to 
the continuous evolution of cyberspace. The nature of cyberspace is thus characterized by 
the rapid evolution of new services derived and combined from logical constructs, all 
operating on top of physical grounds [46]. 
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3. Cyber-Persona Network Layer 
The cyber-persona layer consists of the active participants of cyberspace, i.e., the 
system users, whether human or automated, and the connections between them. A user’s 
digital representation in cyberspace (their cyber-persona) can relate to another entity or 
human making use of personal data, like IP address and phone number. A single user can 
have multiple cyber-personas using different credentials or accounts, and likewise, one 
cyber-persona might have multiple users by using, for instance, a group email address [45]. 
See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The Three Interrelated Layers of Cyberspace. Source: [45]. 
Although JP 3-12 describes three network layers, other reports describe more. This 
could be the result of misunderstanding the concept or probably having a different 
perspective and giving a different definition. Choucri et al. added the information layer 
between the logical and physical layers to refer to the processing, storage, and distribution 
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of information in every possible form within cyberspace, pointing out that one with a 
different vision could build a totally different system [46]. Raymond et al. [47] used five 
cyber planes as a framework to describe cyberspace, with real-world examples in each 
plane. Three of their five cyber planes/layers correspond to the three network layers in JP 
3-12. The other two layers are the supervisory plane that provides the authority to manage 
a cyber operation, and the geographic plane that describes the area where an IS is located. 
C. WELL-SECURED INFORMATION SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
The process of IS configuration has a significant role in InfoSec. The poorly 
configured IS is one of the most common ways that a malicious adversary may take 
advantage of launching a cyber-attack against the system. A well-secured configuration 
defines all the security measures that need to be implemented when building and installing 
an IS. The purpose is to reduce the existence of rectifiable cyber vulnerabilities in the 
system. Unfortunately, as an organization grows, their technology landscape becomes 
increasingly more sophisticated and complex, and they need to protect against failures 
across multiple areas. The components that need to be configured could be an individual 
object or a collection of them where the complexity is escalated. These elements are often 
hierarchically structured, so the overall security should be achieved at each level. For this 
reason, we need a process of documenting system changes that: 
• Monitors and records the functional and physical characteristics of an 
object and system as it evolves over time; 
• Presents, at any time and in detail, the evolutionary history of the system 
as well as the present situation, and; 
• Ensures that all components of a system follow the rules. 
If these criteria are not implemented, we deem an IS to be poorly-configured. The 
first step for configuring a well-secured system is to set a gold standard configuration, and 
continual monitoring of the IS against this standard [48], [49]. There are several standard 
frameworks in the industry, such as NIST, CIS, ISO, etc. These are a set of criteria known 
as the best practice that an organization should follow. The implementation of a standard 
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framework is a demanding procedure that includes the execution of specific steps to 
achieve the development of a secure integrated configuration. Those steps can be met in 
any industry-standard framework, and we will summarize them to the following five steps: 
1. Step 1: Current Situation Imprinting 
In the first phase, we need to record all IT assets of the target organization. These 
assets could be divided into several categories, such as data assets, end-user services, 
materials data, locations, software, etc. After capturing the organization’s asset status, the 
role of the users should be defined, and each user should be classified. This step is crucial 
because the assets should not be examined only as individuals but also as a part of a set. 
The interaction of the assets with each other has an impact on the complexity of the system. 
It is hard to maintain security and availability, and with each new user, device or 
application, the volume of what needs to be monitored and protected increases [50]. 
2. Step 2: Risk Analysis 
Following the precise evaluation of the target’s assets, a risk analysis is performed. 
This is a particularly important step in shaping the target’s security policy. In this phase, 
there is a detailed study of exposures of the system, and a determination is made of the 
vulnerabilities and threats of the system based on the current controls. The method used to 
conduct the risk analysis may be based on the formula BPL (B > P * L), where B is the 
cost to prevent a loss, P is the probability of a loss occurring, and L is the total cost of a 
loss [51]. The cost of preventing a loss or damage will, therefore, be compared with the 
cost of such a loss, together with the likelihood of such a loss occurring. 
Then, the threats for each asset and their impacts are recognized. Additionally, 
potential vulnerabilities for each asset separately identified. Possible losses are recognized 
and categorized according to the degree of risk. The likelihood of a loss occurring is also 
assessed while identifying the necessary countermeasures to avoid risks. At this stage, 
those countermeasures that are most advantageous to the organization are selected. Finally, 
the most appropriate and efficient countermeasures are configured and implemented [52]. 
The effectiveness of countermeasures should be continuously monitored because of the 
constant change of data (new threats, new vulnerabilities, new impacts, etc.) in an IS. The 
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completeness of the risk analysis of an IS is associated with the safety of the physical, 
logical, and cyber-persona layers. 
3. Step 3: Security Plan 
An IS security plan (SP) provides guidance and support on information security 
issues. The SP is determined by the organization management and should be supported in 
practice by the organization itself. The SP should regulate security issues at all levels of 
the organization, and record and elaborate on the set of laws and rules that govern how data 
is managed, secured, and allocated within an organization. The formulation of the SP 
should adopt international standards, in particular the Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) and Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
(ITSEC). TCSEC and ITSEC are standards of U.S. DOD and Europe, respectively [53]. 
They are a structured set of criteria that are used to rate the efficacy of computer security 
within products and systems. The organization’s management should accept and approve 
the text of the security policy. Then, it should be made public to all users of the 
organization, so that everyone will know about the administration’s commitment and how 
the organization approaches security issues. This step is an additional contribution to the 
risk analysis because the SP is one of the most critical countermeasures against the threats 
that were identified in the previous step. 
4. Step 4: Determination of Security Measures 
In this step, the SP is implemented by designing measures that will meet the 
system’s security requirements. Management and planning the security of the IS are related 
to the code of conduct of the organization, the security controls, and the roles and 
responsibilities of the security administration. Equally important is to educate and inform 
the users about the procedures and, more generally, about the security functions of IS [50]. 
Finally, we should consider the security of the backup process and the confidentiality of 
the violation records. This step should include periodic reviews and revisions of the 
measures to avoid an overlap between them. 
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5. Step 5: Contingency Plan 
The IS contingency plan (CP) works in conjunction with the SP. It records all 
procedures and implements measures that ensure the uninterrupted functionality of the 
organization in a possible disaster, malfunction, or total destruction. Overall, the CP not 
only includes the recovery of the computing function and communication infrastructure, 
but it also includes information and procedures for a spare installation (disaster recovery 
facility), or an available alternative location (alternate site) for staff relocation in case of 
total infrastructure destruction, where it is necessary [53].  
A well-secured configuration is the first step for hardening an IS to reduce the 
attack surface and mitigate the damage of an attack. In the next section, we discuss the 
importance of a well-secured system by examining the ransomware attack of 2017 known 
as WannaCry [54]. The effects of combining a zero-day vulnerability and a poorly-secured 
or out-of-date configured IS could be like the effects of the tsunami; they are catastrophic 
and rapidly spread. 
D. ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITY CASE STUDY: WANNACRY 
RANSOMWARE ATTACK OF 2017 
In May 2017, a worldwide cyberattack was launched using the WannaCry 
ransomware attack, which targeted computers that were running a Windows operating 
system with Server Message Block version 1 (SMBv1) [54]. This ransomware attack 
encrypted files on the victim’s computer, then demanded money as Bitcoin in ransom for 
exchange of a decryption key, which allowed the user to access the encrypted files. The 
attack was also considered a web virus because it contained a transport mechanism that 
allowed it to replicate itself to other victims. In essence, the transport code scanned the 
network for vulnerable computers, then used the EternalBlue [55] exploit to access them 
by sending crafted packets from attackers, allowing them to execute arbitrary code 
remotely. And finally, the DoublePulsar [56] tool, which runs in kernel mode, and was 
used as a backdoor through which the virus was injected and installed [54]. 
WannaCry exploited a vulnerability in the Windows SMBv1 protocol to 
compromise computers, loaded malware, and transmitted it to other computers on a target 
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network. WannaCry utilized the vulnerability of allowing remote code execution by 
crafting a custom session request, which included a hard-coded domain name. Before any 
operation, a query to that hard-code domain name was initialized; a successful connection 
caused the termination of “mssecvc,” otherwise it was proceeded [57]. This attack used the 
SMB version 1 and TCP 445 port to propagate in the network. The use of SMB transactions 
allowed for individual reading and writing between an SMB client and a server. 
After the initial SMB handshake, the ransomware connected to the shared inter-
process communication (IPC) $ on the remote machine. One of the features of the 
mentioned cyberattack was that the malicious software was programmed to establish a 
connection to a “hardcoded” network identity. It then sent an initial “NT Trans” request. 
In the case that the request was larger from what is allowed by the SMB “MaxBufferSize,” 
the rest of the request would be transferred as subrequests, resulting in a buffer overflow. 
This vulnerability affected the “srv2.sys kernel” [54] and was set off by distorted “Trans 2 
secondary requests” [55]. These requests included a large payload, consisting of a number 
of NOPs (No-operation instructions), as presented in Figure 5. The malware was moving 
the current status of the SMB server to a state where the attacker could take advantage of 
the existing vulnerability and attack it with a specially designed package [54]. 
 
Figure 5. Preparing Attack via NT Trans. Source: [58]. 
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After successfully exploiting the vulnerability of the protocol, an encrypted 
“payload” has the stager of malware, is transferred in the victim’s computer remotely. This 
“payload” launched a service on the computer called “mssecvc” [59] through the lsass 
process. Lsass is a process of the Windows operating system that enforces system security 
policy. It also verifies users logged on to a Windows server or computer, manages 
password changes, generates access tokens, and writes to the Windows security log. The 
“mssecvc” service was acting by scanning not only the local network but also the internet 
for devices which were accessible, and their SMB ports were exposed. Then it used the 
vulnerability as mentioned earlier to gain remote access and infected them with the 
malware. 
The effects of this attack were massive, and they were rapidly spread. According to 
Europol data, more than 200,000 computers were infected in 150 countries. The National 
Health Service hospitals in the UK were the institutes that were affected by the malware 
mentioned above. It was found that over 70,000 devices were infected, including medical 
equipment such as MRI scanners, etc. The financial damage caused by WannaCry is 
estimated to be more than $4 billion [54]. 
Microsoft discovered the zero-day vulnerability exploited by WannaCry on March 
14, 2017, and they released a security patch nearly two months before the attack was 
launched. As seen in the attack timeline in Figure 6, the extent of the infection could have 
been prevented if IS administrators had installed the patch that Microsoft released on 
March 2017, and if there were not systems that were still running out of date products of 
Microsoft [58]. Additionally, we should point out that the application of the released patch 
would have helped to the mitigation of the spread between poorly configured systems but 
would not have prevented the infection. 
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Figure 6. Timeline of WannaCry Attack 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we defined the challenging issue of information system security, 
and we presented the steps for a well-secured IS configuration as they are defined in several 
industry-standard frameworks. Next, we examined the WannaCry attack of 2017, which 
pointed out the potency of a zero-day attack and the escalation of the results on a poorly 
configured system. Moreover, it demonstrated that in a modern world where new zero-days 
vulnerabilities are revealed every day, a well-secured configuration is indispensable. 
The next chapter covers a zero-day attack from the defender’s and the offender’s 
perspective. It examines the impact of a zero-day vulnerability in the cyber defense of a 
system. Additionally, it analyzes the life cycle of exploit development and the factors that 
can affect it. 
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IV. ZERO-DAY ATTACK FROM THE DEFENSIVE AND 
OFFENSIVE PERSPECTIVES 
The exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability is considered the “holy grail” from the 
offensive cyber perspective. An adversary can launch a zero-day attack, i.e., an attack 
specifically targeting a zero-day vulnerability, leaving the defender in a disadvantageous 
position and called upon to defend their system against an attack that was previously 
unknown.  
This chapter focuses on how the window of exposure for a zero-day vulnerability  
impacts the cybersecurity of a system. Also, we suggest countermeasures and guidelines 
to reduce the possibility of the impact of a zero-day attack. We examine the exploitation of 
zero-day vulnerabilities from the offensive perspective, including the life cycle of exploit 
development and their use in the wild, as well as factors beneficial to exploit development. 
A. DEFENDER PERSPECTIVE 
Robert Mueller, in 2012, said, “There are only two types of companies: those that 
have been hacked and those that will be” [60]. With this in mind, an organization should 
plan their cyber defense actions as if the breach has already happened. As discussed in the 
previous chapter with the WannaCry attack of 2017, the effects of a zero-day attack can 
easily become out of control and their impact catastrophic. 
1. Impact on Cyber Defense 
In the timeline of a zero-day attack, the most crucial period for an organization is 
the time between the introduction of the zero-day vulnerability and the time that an 
effective patch is completely deployed. This period is known as the “window of exposure,” 
and it determines the security risk exposure of the organization’s overall cybersecurity [61]. 
During this period, an organization is vulnerable and the only mechanisms it has for its 
defense are the security plan (SP) and security measures, and the contingency plan (CP), 
described in the previous chapter.  
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The impact of a zero-day attack depends not only on the kind of zero-day 
vulnerability that was exploited, but also on the structure of the system that was targeted. 
Systems that have implemented defense-in-depth could restrict the effects of a zero-day 
attack because of their multiple defensive layers that are built-in to protect the cyber 
infrastructure [62]. If a zero-day exploit bypasses one defense mechanism, there are several 
others in place that could potentially thwart the zero-day attack. Stated plainly, strong 
defense-in-depth may be able to indirectly withstand such attacks, despite a defender’s lack 
of knowledge about the zero-day vulnerability being exploited in the attack. 
The existence of a zero-day vulnerability could expose the entire cybersecurity of 
a system. An adversary could be targeting confidential data, financial information, or 
critical business plans, which could cause an intolerable effect on the operation or the 
reputation of the organization. An indication of an organization’s ability to minimize the 
impact of a zero-day attack is closely tied to two criteria: how quickly the vulnerability is 
handled, and how quickly a patch is developed. This reaction time is also known as zero-
day patch rate, which is “the number of patches a vendor is able to release at the day of the 
public disclosure of a new vulnerability” [61]. By having a high zero-day patch rate, 
vendors try to reduce the window of exposure for their users. However, in order to achieve 
this, the vendor will need advance notification and a vulnerability research team that will 
continuously investigate their product or by cooperating with independent vulnerability 
researchers [61]. 
Several studies, such as Shahzad et al. showed that OS and products from Microsoft 
and Apple are more attractive to hackers [1], [3], [63]. Therefore, it is more rewarding for 
attackers to develop a zero-day exploit for products from these two companies because of 
their popularity in the market and the high use in enterprises. Additionally, the comparison 
between closed-source and open-source vendor patch rates showed that open-source 
vendors have a slower response as they rely on volunteer developers to investigate their 
code and disclose zero-day vulnerabilities [1]. At the same time, an adversary could more 
quickly develop a zero-day exploit against an open-source product due to easier access to 
the code. It should also be noted that different vendors show better performance in different 
kinds of zero-day vulnerabilities; for example, the best choice for an organization that 
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needs to harden their system against buffer overflow attacks should be the deployment of 
the Solaris OS, which has a statistical buffer overflow vulnerability rate of only 13%, as 
opposed to a 20% rate in Windows and MacOS systems [1]. To conclude, although the 
statistics point out that most zero-day exploits were targeting closed-source products, an 
organization should not rely only on that for its cyber defenses. Robustness cybersecurity 
should take in account the characteristics of a network and the zero-day patch rate that each 
vendor offers. 
2. Characteristics That Increase the Impact of a Zero-Day Vulnerability  
There are characteristics of a network that can increase its vulnerability to zero-day 
attacks. The complexity of the network is a common factor that affects the management 
efficiency of a system. The topology, in combination with the complexity, could make an 
entire network more vulnerable to zero-day attacks, because of the variety of different 
components that need to be integrated, which could create inconsistencies in overall 
security. So even if it is widely believed that “greater diversity in software and services 
may help to improve a network’s security,” the implementation should be undertaken with 
precautionary steps [64]. The heterogeneity of network component functionalities and 
operating conditions could create security gaps and potential new zero-day vulnerabilities 
that did not exist in each individual component. 
Networks consisting of IoT devices are more vulnerable to zero-day attacks, 
especially when these devices are not divided into separate zones. The implementation of 
firewalls and Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) can lead to better security [65]. IoT devices 
should be segmented from critical infrastructure because they have limitations in the 
hardware and lack of computational power. So, often they do not have built-in security, 
and for that reason, they can more easily be hijacked. Moreover, many IoT devices use 
firmware that could be found on the Internet, and an adversary can easily examine it for 
potential flaws that can lead to exploitable zero-day vulnerabilities.  
The strategy to segment the network should also be followed by organizations that 
allow their users to “bring your own device” (BYOD). If users misuse their devices or lose 
them, an adversary could take advantage of them to create a breach in the security of the 
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organization. From a security administrator perspective, BYOD could increase the 
potential access points for zero-day attacks especially if users do not follow security 
guidelines and requirements. Therefore, separating the network into zones could improve 
network’s security. In this way, the effect of a breach could be minimized to only a specific 
segment, and any critical zones could be unaffected by placing them further from the 
perimeter. A suggested strategy for the administrator is to use DMZs to restrict access from 
the internet to the internal network of an organization. In this way, even if an adversary has 
developed a zero-day exploit for the targeted system, it still must penetrate through the first 
layer of security, the DMZ. Next, if the adversary is able to penetrate the DMZ, a well-
configured deny-by-default firewall that whitelists only known safe traffic will be the 
second obstacle to overcome. So, by dividing the network to different zones and filtering 
the traffic between them, an administrator empowers the organization’s security. 
3. Zero-day Countermeasures 
Although defenders have many solutions to guard their systems against known 
attacks (e.g., IPS/IDS, antivirus, firewall, etc.), zero-day attacks present unique challenges. 
The defenders are in a disadvantageous position since the lack of knowledge and 
information about these unknown attacks deprive them of the opportunity to defend their 
system effectively. For this reason, a defender’s goal should be to reduce the attack surface 
of the system and built their defense-in-depth with several layers. At this point, the 
prevention and not the detection of a threat is the most efficient solution to mitigate the 
results of a zero-day attack. The following sub-sections describe countermeasures and 
guidelines that can increase a defender’s zero-day vulnerability awareness. 
a. Address Space Layout Randomization 
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is an operating system framework 
that improves security by randomizing address space allocation in memory. ASLR can be 
used by the stack, the heap, the program’s pile, or a DLL, and each time a memory address 
is assigned, it is different from that which was used the previous time [66]. By randomizing 
the memory location of a process in memory, ASLR prevents an adversary from being able 
to assume the memory address of the targeted vulnerability. ASLR is a security tool that 
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can prevent the exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability by obfuscating the mechanism for 
allocating memory and adding a layer in the system’s defense [67]. So, ASLR makes zero-
day vulnerability exploitation more difficult for the adversary, without having to remove 
the vulnerability. 
b. Host Intrusion Prevention System 
The purpose of Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) is to secure a system 
against known malicious activities by detecting their signatures. Some HIPS systems are 
anomaly-based, meaning they use an acceptable range of “normal” activities and behaviors 
to raise alerts when this range is violated. HIPS can monitor the host and search for 
anomalies in the behavior of system activity. HIPS operation is not determined by any 
specific signature, it uses a baseline for the activity of the ports, processes, protocols even 
in the bandwidth [68]. So, in the case of malicious activity, a HIPS can stall this activity 
and alert the administrator to its occurrence. If malicious activity causes abnormal behavior 
observations, HIPS could detect it so that it could be successfully used as a tool to identify 
and protect against certain zero-day attacks. Moreover, it provides an extra customizable 
layer of defense because it allows the administrator to parameterize the setting for each 
system [67]. The “normal” activity is not the same for each host in a network, so by 
customizing the rules for each host, the benefit for an administrator is that the rate of false-
positive alerts is decreased. 
c. Stateful Application Control 
Stateful application control continuously examines and validates the current 
application state against the database of all proper known application states. Stateful 
application control does not need specific malware signatures or information about 
malicious activity, therefore, it is an efficient way to block zero-day attacks. Its operation 
depends on validating the state of the application, and in this way, it can successfully block 
unknown threats. Stateful application control monitors the state whenever a connection is 
established, or an operation writes to the file system [69]. An application is allowed to 
proceed if and only if its current state matches a legitimate state, which means that the data 
of the executable procedure are validated. However, if the state does not match, it is an 
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indicator that malicious activity may be taking place, and the machine should be protected 
from potential risk [69]. Stateful application control will block the execution and will alert 
the administrator regarding the trace of a suspicious attempt. Therefore, it provides the 
ability for an organization to protect itself against known or unknown threats. 
d. Secure OSI Layer 8 
Even if most of the cyberattacks are highly sophisticated and use advanced 
techniques, it should never be forgotten that the untrained human is the weakest point in 
the chain of security. Sometimes it is easier to exploit a system by taking advantage of 
human errors. Therefore, the education of the user should be a high priority in an 
organization. Users should establish security habits and best practices that will keep them 
safe, and consequentially an organization will build an extra layer against zero-day threats 
[70]. The education of the user should make them aware about social engineering 
techniques that could target them and how they should act if they have a flicker that 
someone is targeting them or trying to compromise them.  
B. OFFENSIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The success of a cyber-attack is more likely if the vulnerability it exploits is not 
known to the targeted victim. According to the recent research, once the vulnerability 
researchers discover an exploitable vulnerability, the average time to develop a functioning 
exploit is relatively short, with a median time of 22 days, and it can survive on average 
between 5.39 and 8.84 years [3]. This seems to indicate that attackers have an advantage 
over defenders because they can develop a zero-day exploit in much less time than it takes 
for defenders to become aware of the zero-day vulnerability and develop a patch to mitigate 
it. 
1. The Life Cycle of an Exploit Development 
Research by Ablon et al. showed that the procedure for the development of an 
exploit includes many steps, each of which can go through several iterations, as shown in 
Figure 7 [3]. The exploit development life cycle is composed of three phases “Discovery,” 
“Implementation,” and “Operational Handoff”. 
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Figure 7. The Exploit Development Life Cycle. Source: [3].  
The “Discovery” phase aims to discover any unknown vulnerabilities and built a Proof 
of Concept (PoC) exploit. This phase includes the following steps [3]: 
• Audit. The vulnerability researchers try to crash the vulnerable system by 
triggering errors under abnormal operating conditions. The complexity of the 
code and compatibility issues usually offer the researchers more 
opportunities for identifying exploitable vulnerabilities. 
• Triage. The crash is examined to determine the root cause. The cause of the 
crash is valuable because it could reveal a potential zero-day vulnerability. 
• Trigger. Once the vulnerability researchers have determined the cause of the 
crash, they will need to develop a reliable procedure to trigger it and provoke 
a crash at will. This stage is where a PoC exploit is created.  
The Trigger step is the final one for researchers who work for the benefit of the 
vendor, such as bug bounty hunters. They stop at the end of the “Discovery” phase because 
their intent is to identify and understand the conditions that actually trigger the exploit. For 
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zero-day exploit developers, however, they transition into the “Implementation” phase, where 
their goal is to have created a fully functional exploit for the target system. Once again, this 
phase is iterative, and its steps are [3]: 
• Debug. The researchers examine each crash, evaluate the reliability of the 
trigger causes, and determine how they should take advantage of those 
causes. If more requirements are needed for the development of a fully 
functional exploit, the previous phase should be repeated. 
• Exploit. Here the researchers determine the components for the creation of a 
fully functional exploit. They will focus on the establishment of a foothold, 
and build up the exploit by adding in capabilities to increase its reliability. 
The final phase of the exploit development life cycle is the “Operational Handoff” in 
which the vulnerability researchers transfer their developed exploit from lab to a real-world 
scenario where the environmental conditions may vary each time. After a successful launch 
of the exploit, the developer needs to change the signature of the exploit for follow-on attacks 
to avoid detection by AV and IDS security systems. This will increase the window of exposure 
and the longevity of a zero-day vulnerability [3]. 
The most intriguing correlation of previous analysis about the development of a zero-
day exploit is the result of the statistics about the development time of exploits and their 
longevity. It demonstrates that the offensive side had the upper hand when they discover a 
zero-day vulnerability before the vendor or system defender. Even though the procedure of 
the development of a zero-day exploit seems to be time-consuming, the statistics confirm the 
opposite when the range of the development for the majority of exploits is between 6 and 37 
days [3]. This highlights the advantage that an offender has against the targeted system, since 
they have time to research, test, and reinforce an exploit before the vulnerability it targets 
becomes known. At the same time, the lack of a patch or any detection mechanism for the 
vulnerability will not prevent development of a reliable and efficient zero-day attack. 
Additionally, successful completion of the “Discovery” phase could not only reveal 
new zero-day vulnerabilities but provide ways to explore zero-day vulnerabilities that were 
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unexploitable until then. Also, it may be assumed that in a system where one zero-day 
vulnerability is discovered, multiple vulnerabilities could be found.  
Another striking observation is the comparison of the average life of a zero-day exploit 
(6.9 years) [3] to the average time that an identified zero-day vulnerability remains publicly 
unknown (310 days) [29]. This seems to clearly demonstrate  that exploiting a zero-day 
vulnerability is far easier (or at least takes far less time) than publicly disclosing and patching 
it by the vendor. Therefore, the adversary could patiently follow the procedures of exploit 
development, take advantage of the fact that the vendor is unaware of or ignores the existence 
of the zero-day vulnerability, and take the needed time to develop a fully capable and effective 
exploit. Moreover, by examining the average life of a zero-day exploit, it can be reasonably 
assumed that developing a patch is demanding and needs a sophisticated approach. Generating 
a patch requires reverse-engineering of the zero-day attack and patching the root cause for 
every way that it could be possibly be triggered. 
Finally, the critical element to the success of a zero-day exploit is the length of its 
development period, which overlaps with the period between vulnerability introduction (tv) 
and exploit released in the wild (te), as illustrated in Figure 2 in Chapter 2. Several factors 
could impact the exploit development period, such as the skills of the developers, their 
resources, defender security mitigations, and vendor awareness, etc. 
2. Factors That Impact Exploit Development 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of research in real data of zero-day vulnerabilities. As 
Ben Hawkes presented during his presentation at the Black Hat USA in 2019, “the value for 
the attacker of a zero-day outweighs the value for the defender. The attacker is incentivized 
to keep information private and mislead us” [71]. This is the reason for the existence of a 
black market for zero-day vulnerabilities, which can be sold for $50,000-$300,000, depending 
on the kind of the zero-day vulnerability [3]. Some ways that may be beneficial to the OCO 




Several researchers at the Black Hat conference in 2018 discussed their first steps in 
the research of zero-day vulnerabilities and how they developed their skills. One common 
characteristic was their participation in Capture the Flag (CTF) and war games. They 
mentioned that this helped them to sharpen their skills and helped them identify patterns in 
the discovery of vulnerabilities since, as they noted, vulnerabilities in the same class have the 
same pattern [72]. Additionally, another approach could be the use of machine learning, where 
artificial intelligence (AI) can be trained from CTF and war games data. In the future, the AI 
approaches may become powerful assets in the research and discovery of potential zero-day 
vulnerabilities. There is a parallel one can draw between this and the approach followed in 
Mayhem [73]. Mayhem did not specifically focus on finding zero-day vulnerabilities but his 
approach could be extended to this class of vulnerabilities. 
b. Stockpile 
After the discovery of a zero-day vulnerability, researchers need to determine if they 
can develop an exploit. Only a subset of zero-day vulnerabilities can lead to a fully functional 
exploit. Many times, the exploitation of the vulnerability may need specific circumstances, or 
a “blocker bug” may protect the target system and stand in the way of developing a zero-day 
exploit. In this case, researchers may keep such vulnerabilities hidden for future use, because 
something that is not exploitable one day may be in the future. This is known as stockpiling 
[3]. The RAND Corporation, using real world data from zero-day vulnerabilities, showed a 
low collision rate to undiscovered vulnerabilities [3]. This showed that the likelihood of 
another vulnerability research team discovering the same vulnerability, and presenting a risk 
of losing a zero-day vulnerability from the stockpile, is slight. So, the researchers should 
revisit them frequently when a new version of the target system is released.  
Another benefit of zero-day vulnerability stockpiling could be the development of an 
exploit that takes advantage of more than one vulnerability on the target, even if they are 
known vulnerabilities [74]. Research could reveal combinations that will increase the 
reliability of a zero-day attack and reduce the development time because of the existing 
knowledge. 
47 
c. Weakest link in the chain 
The desire to automate systems and reduce human intervention has resulted in the 
broader use of automated systems on many organization’s network. Such systems can be part 
of the Internet of Things (IoT) that transfers data over the network without the interference of 
a human. The security of such systems can be described as a chain, which is only as strong as 
its weakest component.  
Many IoT devices use universal firmware, which makes it easier to manage and 
control multiple IoT devices. This use of common firmware subjects the IoT devices to several 
types of threats [75]. An adversary can take advantage of these threats to save time and bypass 
the device’s security or test them for potential zero-day vulnerabilities. Additionally, an 
adversary can exploit characteristics of the device that are more frequently used in working 
zero-day exploits, such as memory corruption and deserialization [3], [71]. The strategy of 
identifying the weakest link in these systems, and testing it for the most common 
characteristics of zero-day vulnerabilities, could minimize the development time of a zero-
day exploit. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we examined zero-day attack from the defender and the attacker 
perspectives. We evaluated the impact of zero-day vulnerabilities on system cybersecurity 
and analyzed potential characteristics that make a system more susceptible to zero-day 
vulnerabilities. Moreover, we presented standard countermeasures and guidelines to increase 
the zero-day vulnerability awareness of the defender. Finally, from the attacker perspective, 
we analyzed the life cycle of exploit development and suggested measures that would be 
beneficial in the development time of a zero-day exploit. The next chapter provides overall 
conclusions of this research and discusses potential opportunities for future work. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
The main goals of this thesis were to thoroughly examine the importance of zero-
day vulnerabilities to cybersecurity and defense, and to analyze how the development time 
of zero-days exploits can impact offensive cyber operations. We conducted background 
research to more thoroughly understand the crucial role of zero-day vulnerabilities in cyber 
operations, both offensive and defensive, and we analyzed the life cycle of zero-day 
vulnerabilities to understand how it affects the cyber defense of a system.  
We then examined the dynamic concept of information system security and the 
implementations of several industry-standard system frameworks to suggest well-secured 
IS configurations. This concept is critically important because a well-secured IS 
configuration is the first obstacle that an adversary will confront in trying to penetrate the 
system, so it can greatly limit the attacker’s options and mitigate the results of their actions. 
As a demonstration of this, we studied the results of the WannaCry attack of 2017. 
Additionally, we examined zero-day attacks from the defender’s and the offender’s 
perspectives, specifically the impact of a zero-day vulnerability to cyber defense of a 
system. We presented potential characteristics that make a system more vulnerable to zero-
day vulnerabilities, and countermeasures and guidelines to reduce the attack surface of 
such a system to mitigate the damage of a zero-day attack against a zero-day vulnerability. 
Finally, we studied the life cycle of exploit development, and how awareness of zero-day 
vulnerabilities can be beneficial to the development time of a zero-day exploit. These ideas 
are aimed to reduce the development time of a zero-day exploit and benefit OCO 
operations. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The final conclusions to this thesis are derived by answering the original research 
questions posed in Chapter I. 
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1. Primary Question 
How does the existence of zero-day vulnerabilities in computer systems, and 
the time for adversaries to develop exploits against these vulnerabilities, impact the 
overall level of cybersecurity of that system? 
We reasoned that a zero-day vulnerability in a system can compromise the entire 
security infrastructure of that system. Its overall impact is not only determined by the kind 
of zero-day vulnerability, but also by the structure and configuration of the targeted system. 
Systems with layered defenses may be able to better restrict and mitigate the effects of a 
zero-day attack because multiple layers of defense force vulnerability exploiters to 
penetrate through each layer.  
Additionally, we found that systems with higher complexity are more likely to be 
found with zero-day vulnerabilities or ways to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities that were 
previously not exploitable. Moreover, systems that do not implement segmentation of the 
network to separate IoT devices and user systems from the critical infrastructure offer a 
larger surface for zero-day vulnerability exploitation. Finally, systems with a high zero-
day patch rate tend to reduce the time of the exposure window and, therefore, minimize the 
overall impact of such vulnerabilities to their cybersecurity. 
2. Secondary Question 
How might the total time to develop zero-day exploits, including the time to 
identify associated zero-day vulnerabilities, be reduced to better support offensive 
cyber operators? 
In studying statistics of the life cycle of exploit development, namely the average 
time to develop a zero-day exploit, the average time that a zero-day exploit survives, and 
the average time that a zero-day vulnerability remains publicly unknown, we conclude that 
a zero-day exploit can be developed more rapidly than the time it takes to discover and 
patch a vulnerability. This is because the average time for an adversary to develop a reliable 
zero-day exploit is 22 days [3], while the time for a vendor to identify a zero-day 
vulnerability that it is already discovered by an adversary is about 310 days [29]. 
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A complete answer to this research question is somewhat limited by the lack of 
research on real-world data on zero-day vulnerabilities. The high value that zero-day 
vulnerabilities have for attackers and the cyber black-market motivates researchers to keep 
their results private, which makes open academic research difficult. However, from our 
research we can conjecture several factors that could potentially reduce the development 
time of a zero-day exploit and benefit OCO operators: 
• Training zero-day vulnerability research teams in Capture-the-Flag (CTF) 
and similar cyber war games can help sharpen their skills, expand their 
CO toolbox, and identify patterns in the discovery of same class zero-day 
vulnerabilities. A quite promising approach would be to analyze data on 
how participants in CTF and war games are working to discover 
vulnerabilities and use them for training an artificial intelligence (AI) 
system. 
• By stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities that could not be exploited at the 
time they were discovered, they can be kept hidden for future use since 
they might be useful in a future scenario or may become exploitable under 
different circumstances. 
• Targeting the weakest link in the security chain. The increasing usage of 
IoT devices and sometimes their lack of built-in security or proper 
configuration makes them a valuable target for exploitation. In particular, 
focusing OCO efforts on discovering zero-day vulnerabilities in these 
devices offers a potentially rich source of exploitation. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
The following presents areas for future research to expand on the work done in this 
thesis. 
52 
1. Automated Zero-Day Vulnerability Analysis Tool 
This research was a first step towards deepening an understanding of zero-day 
vulnerabilities and their exploitability. A goal of the research was to provide a foundational 
work toward creating an automated zero-day vulnerability analysis tool. This automated 
tool would scan for zero-day behaviors in systems to identify potentially unknown 
vulnerabilities. The use of this tool could be beneficial either for the vendors to help them 
identify zero-day vulnerabilities in their products and patch them, or to OCO operators to 
help them discover exploitable zero-day vulnerabilities on targeted system. 
2. Examine Open-Source Products and Compare Them to Closed-
Source 
Many organizations today widely use open-source products for their business 
practices and procedures. Future research could focus specifically on examining whether 
open-source products are more beneficial for system defenders or their attackers. It should 
question if the openness of a system helps the vendors discover quicker a zero-day 
vulnerability, and publicly disclose it and patch it before an adversary can exploit it. Also, 
it could examine whether the open-source nature of such systems enhances their security 
by allowing more people to contribute to their defense. 
3. AI And Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 
As it was mentioned before, the usage of AI would be a powerful asset in the 
research and discovery of zero-day vulnerabilities. Data from CTF and war games could 
be collected and used for the training of AI. Later, the AI could be tested in a system for 
discovering zero-day vulnerabilities and then compare the result to the result of a human 
vulnerability research team. 
4. Study Real-World Data of Zero-Day Exploits 
Further analysis needs to be done on real-world data of zero-day vulnerability 
exploits to establish better awareness about them. Knowledge of zero-day vulnerabilities 
is a great asset for attackers as they can profit by selling this knowledge in the cyber black 
market. This can dissuade researchers from publishing their results, which makes open 
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academic research difficult. The output from an analysis of real-world data of zero-day 
vulnerability exploits would be beneficial for the defender’s perspective. Defenders and 
vendors could reduce the impact of a zero-day vulnerability and improve their 
methodology to discover and patch it. This requires detailed knowledge of how attackers 
work to reinforce their defenses. 
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